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courses converged near the entrance to
St. Tropez Bay at a mark designated as
"A." As it approached mark "A," the
Charles Jourdan was sailing to lee
ward and believed it had the right of
way pursuant to International Yacht
Racing Rule (IYRR) 37. 1 : "[A] wind
ward yacht shall keep clear of a lee
ward yacht." The crew of the Endeav
our failed to make an attempt to change
course to windward until the last
minute and as a result the boom of the
Endeavour struck the backstay of the
smaller Charles Jourdan, causing sub
stantial damage.
An International Jury was convened,
as per the IYRR, to determine fault for
the collision. The International Jury,
applying the rules agreed to by the par
ticipants in the race, found the Endeav
our at fault.
In September 1 993, the owner of the
Charles Jourdan filed an action in ad
miralty, seeking compensation for the
damage sustained, and had the Endeav
our arrested. The Endeavour's owners
denied liability and counterclaimed for
losses due to alleged false arrest of the
vessel. The district court held that Ar
ticles 1 2 and 1 3 of the Convention on
International Regulation of Collisions
at Sea (COLREGS), 33 U.S.C. § 1 600
et seq., 33 C.F.R. § 80. 0 1 et seq., pre
empted application of the rules of a pri
vate yacht racing organization.
The district court ignored the findings
of the International Jury and con
cluded, under COLREGS Rule 1 3, 33
U.S.C. foil. § 1 602, that the Charles
Jourdan was an overtaking vessel re
quired to keep clear of the Endeavour.
Pursuant to the "Pennsylvania Rule,"
The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. ( 1 9 Wall.)
1 25, 22 L.Ed. 1 48 ( 1 873), failure to
abide by navigation rules creates a pre
sumption of negligence. Accordingly,
the Charles Jourdan was presumed to
be at fault. The Endeavour's failure to
take action to avoid the collision was
found to be significant and was appor
tioned 40% of fault. The court deter
mined that the physical damage to the
Charles Jourdan was valued at
$ 1 0,000, which was reduced to $4,000.
The first circuit, although noting that
the COLREGS were historically meant
to be the " international rules of the
road for maritime traffic," 58 F.3d at
4, also stated: "[N]othing in their hisFall1995
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tory, or in the public policy issues that led
to their enactment, indicates that they
were meant to regulate voluntary private
sports activity in which the participants
have waived their application and in
which no interference with nonparticipat
ing maritime traffic is implicated." !d.
The court based its conclusion not only on
the nature of the COLREGS and the pri
vate activity involved, but also on the
'·strong public policy in favor of the pri
vate settlement of disputes." 58 F.3d at 5.
The court traced through a number of ven
erable English decisions the premise that
"when one voluntarily enters a yacht race
for which published sailing instructions
set out the conditions of participation, a
private contract results between the partic
ipants." !d. Such a contract established
the conditions under which the partici
pants agreed to be bound. "The parties
agreed to the substantive rules for deter
mining fault, they agreed to the adjudicat
ing forum, and they were apprised of the
procedures. They appeared before [the In
ternational Jury], submitted to its jurisdic
tion, presented evidence and argument,
and thereafter were served with that
body's findings and final decision." 58
F.3d at 6.
The appeals court also took note of fed
eral policy favoring arbitration under § 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act, which
specifically defines "collisions" as arbitra
ble "maritime transactions." The two
yachts had agreed to be contractually
bound by the rules of the road as set forth
in the IYRR. The court, finding that the
IYRR procedures adequately addressed
due process concerns, reversed the district
court, commenting "It is hard to find fault
with such a process, particularly when it is
exactly what the participants agreed to."
58 F.3d at 7.
The first circuit, however, agreed with
the district court that it had valid jurisdic
tion over the damages issue, stating that
courts were the rightful forum for the liti
gation of damages, unless yacht racing au
thorities .provided for private means of
resolution. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's finding that there were
$ 1 0,000 in damages resultant from the
collision. However, the first circuit held
that it was error for the lower court to have
mitigated the damages by assessing the
Charles Jourdan for comparative fault,
since the International Jury had preemp
tively found the Endeavour responsible

for the
collision,
thereupon
reinstating
the full
$ 1 0,000
award to the
Charles
Jourdan.
George M.
Chalos
Class of 1997
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Maritime Cargo
SUBSTITUTE VESSEL IS NOT A
COG SA UNREASONABL E
DEVIATION UNDER TERM S OF
BILL OF L ADING
A carri er's restowage of cargo onto a
vessel di fferent from that ori gi nally
named i n a contract of carri age i s not
an"unreasonable devi ati on" from the
contract i f a provi si on allows for ves
sel substi tuti on "to perform all or
part of the carri age. "
(Yang Machine Tool Co. v. Sea-Land
Service,

Inc.,

CA9,

58 F.3d

1350,

6130195)

The Yang Machine Tool Company
(Yang Machine) contracted with Sea
Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land) to trans
port a large horizontal machining center
from China to California. Since the
cargo was too large to fit inside a stan
dard 40-foot enclosed container, it was
secured by steel bands in two parts on
open "flat racks," metal pallets without
side walls or tops, and placed on board
the Merchant Prince. The Merchant
Prince carried the cargo from China to
Yokohama, Japan, where it was off
loaded onto the Sea/and Patriot for
completion of the carriage to California.
During loading onto the Sea/and Pa
triot, a hoisting cable broke, resulting in
damage to the cargo.
The bill of lading identified the Mer
chant Prince as the carrying vessel.
Nothing in the bill indicated that the
cargo would be restowed aboard the
Sea/and Patriot. The bill contained a
XVIIR AC4
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provision reserving the right of Sea-Land
to use another vessel "to perform all or
part of the carriage without giving notice
to the shipper. It also contained a provi
sion limiting liability to $500.00 per con
tainer for damage occurring during car
riage unless the shipper declared a higher
value on the face of the bill. Yang Ma
chine had not declared a higher value.
Yang Machine brought suit against Sea
Land in district court, bringing a summary
judgment motion for damages in the
amount of $241,700. Sea-Land cross-mo
tioned for summary judgment, to limit its
liability to $1,000.00 based on the con
tract and 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 304(5).
The lower court granted Yang Machine's
motion, finding Sea-Land had unreason
ably deviated by its restowage of cargo
aboard the Sea/and Patriot. On appeal,
the ninth circuit reversed, holding that
Sea-Land had not unreasonably deviated
from the contract and Yang Machine had
failed to exercise its option to declare
value beyond the $500 limitation. The ap
peals court remanded, limiting Sea-Land's
liability.
The question before the appeals court
was whether Sea-Land's transfer of Yang
Machine's cargo from the Merchant
Prince to the Sea/and Patriot constituted
an unreasonable deviation, ousting Sea
Land from the $500 package limitation of
46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5).
Under COGSA,carrier liability for dam
age to cargo is limited to $500 per pack
age. This limitation does not exist if either
an unreasonable deviation from the terms
of the bill of lading occurs, or if the ship
per has not been afforded the opportunity
to declare a value exceeding the $500
package limit.
The ninth circuit first discussed the dis
trict court's assertion that Sea-Land unrea
sonably deviated because the bill of lading
did not contain a transshipment clause,
which allows a carrier to transfer cargo
from one vessel to another during car
riage. The district court opined that the
transfer from one ship to another violated
the contract. The ninth circuit found that
Clause 3 in the bill of lading gave Sea
Land the right to use another vessel to
complete all or part of the voyage and pro
vided sufficient notice to Yang Machine
of that possibility. Clause 3 in Sea-Land's
bill, although not containing the word
"transshipment," contained language
found in bills of lading of other major carFall1995
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riers which the district court agreed
contained sufficient notice of potential
transshipment. Using a substitute ves
sel for completion of the voyage was.
the appeals court held, a transshipment
and not a deviation from the contract of
carriage.
Yang Machine contended that Clause
3 in Sea-Land's bill of lading was a
"liberty clause.'' A liberty clause is a
clause which may be unenforceable if it
gives a carrier unreasonable freedom to
alter aspects of carriage. In evaluating
the content of Clause 3,the ninth circu �
determined that the clause contained
two separate and distinct paragraphs.
Although the first paragraph contained
language found in a typical liberty
clause, the second, containing language
permitting Sea-Land to use a substitute
vessel for all or part of the carriage, was
enforc'eable, since it did not contain
typical liberty clause language.
The limitation under COGSA would
not have been available, the court also
stated, if the shipper had not been given
"fair opportunity" to declare a value
higher than $500. The court was un
convinced by Yang Machine's claim
that the limitation ofliability provisions
noted on the bill prevented it from
declaring actual value, since the shipper
had never inquired into making a decla
ration of higher value. Yang Machine's
contention regarding lack of opportu
nity was further weakened by the fact
that the company had previously
shipped via Sea-Land on many occa
sions and never contested the limitation
clause in the bill nor attempted to de
clare higher value. The shipper's fail
ure to claim higher value was probably
prompted, the court observed, by an
economic decision, since it would have
had to pay higher fees to insure the
cargo beyond the express limitation.
This rationale was supported by the fact
that Yang Machine separately insured
the cargo, receiving payment from its
insurer after the cargo was damaged.
Harry C. Demiris, Jr.
Class of 1 998

Seaman's Damages
N O P UNITIVE DAM AG ES FOR
FAIL URE TO P AY
M AIN TEN AN CE & CURE TO
JON ES ACT SEAM AN
Ni nth ci rcui t award s reasonable at
torney's fees- but not p uni ti ve d am
ages- on clai m for wi llful and p ersi s
tent fai lure of emp loyer to ei ther i n
vesti gate mai ntenance and cure clai m
or to p ay mai ntenance.
(Glynn

v.

Roy AI Boat Management

Corp. , CA9, 57 F.3d 1495, 6121195)

Christopher Glynn (Glynn) was hired
as a crew member in late January 1 992
by Daniel 1. Shawhan (Shawhan), cap
tain and master of the FN No Problem,
a boat owned by Roy AI Boat Manage
ment Corporation (Roy AI). Glynn
signed a written agreement which stated
terms of his employment, such as the
compensation arrangement, grounds for
termination, etc. While the No Problem
was docked in Honolulu, Hawaii, Glynn
was fired for coming late to work.
Glynn brought suit under the Jones Act
and general maritime law, alleging he
had sustained injuries while he was a
crew member of the No Problem. The
jury returned verdicts favoring Glynn
on his claims for unseaworthiness, neg
ligence and maintenance against both
Roy AI and Shawhan, finding both to be
Jones Act employers. (The court had
left the issue of whether or not Shawhan
was an employer to the jury.) The jury
also awarded punitive damages after de
termining defendants
had
acted
"arbitrarily, willfully, and with bad
faith" in neglecting to provide mainte
nance and cure. The district judge
granted judgment n.o.v. in favor of de
fendants on the issue of punitive dam
ages on the basis that such damages
were unavailable as a matter of law, but
awarded attorney's fees on the claim for
maintenance and cure. The court denied
Glynn prejudgment interest since he had
failed to request that the jury consider
the question. Plaintiff and defendants
appealed to the ninth circuit.
The main issues in the case involved
determination of who was Glynn's true
Jones Act employer; whether attorney's
XVIIR AC5

